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1. Introduction
This paper studies revenue maximizing allocation mechanisms for multiple objects in a
very general model that allows buyersoutside payo¤s to depend on their types. Objects
can be heterogeneous, and they can be simultaneously complements for some buyers and
substitutes for others. Buyerspayo¤s may depend on the entire allocation of the objects,
not merely on the ones they obtain, on their costs, which are private information, and on the
costs of their competitors. Therefore the auction outcome may a¤ect buyers irrespectively
of whether they win any objects or not, and irrespectively of whether they participate in
the auction or not. Non-participation payo¤s may then very well depend on their cost,
(type). Applications of this problem range from the allocation of positions in teams, to the
allocation of airport take-o¤ and landing slots, privatization, advertising and many more.
We show that with type-dependent non-participation payo¤s, a revenue maximizing
assignment of the objects can crucially depend on the outside options that buyers face.
Therefore, outside options can a¤ect the degree of e¢ ciency of revenue maximizing auctions.
Depending on the shape of outside payo¤s, sometimes an optimal mechanism will allocate
the objects in an ex-post e¢ cient way. An important insight of monopoly theory is that
a monopolist faces a trade-o¤ between revenue maximization and e¢ ciency, and sacrices
e¢ ciency to increase revenue by selling less than it is socially desirable. The monopolist in
this paper1 does not always face this trade-o¤ since a revenue maximizing allocation of the
goods can be ex-post e¢ cient. However, our analysis also shows that sometimes a revenue
maximizing seller will sell too muchcompared to the socially desirable level. The second
lesson is that with type-dependent outside options a revenue maximizing monopolist may
induce ine¢ ciencies of a di¤erent nature compared to the classical monopoly theory.
We now illustrate with a simple example how outside options can increase both revenue
and e¢ ciency of revenue maximizing mechanisms when outside payo¤s are type-dependent.
Suppose that a small company in Silicon Valley develops a valuable new technology. This
company does not have the necessary infrastructure to reap its benets, so it is essentially
worthless for it. There is, however, a large rm, (say company A), that is willing to purchase
it. The value of the new technology to company A is given by 500; 000  500; 000c; where c
is private information and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. We assume that irrespective of its
cost realization, giving the technology to A maximizes the sum of consumer and producer
surplus. If company A does not get the technology and no-one else does either, As payo¤ is
zero: From Myerson (1981) or from Riley and Samuelson (1981), we know that the best that
the developer can do is to make a take-it-or leave-it o¤er to company A of $250; 000. Then,
company A will get the invention only if its cost parameter is below 12 . This maximizes
ex-ante expected revenue, which is $125; 000; but it is ine¢ cient, because the developer is
stuck half the time with a worthless (for it) invention, whereas company A would generate
1Such a comparison is legitimate, since the seller in our model is a multiproduct monopolist who instead
of choosing revenue maximizing prices, is choosing revenue maximizing mechanisms.
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non-negative payo¤ for all cost realizations.
Now suppose that the developer can make the invention publicly available by making it
open source. This possibility changes As outside options. The payo¤ of company A in case
of open-sourcing is given by 100; 000   1; 000; 000c. If the developer considers threatening
company A, in case it drops out of the sale, which threat should it use? The answer is not
obvious since the developer does not know company As cost parameter, so it does not know
which alternative hurts more.2 If A is very e¢ cient, (c < 110), it would prefer the invention
to become open-source, instead of the seller keeping it, since 100; 000   1; 000; 000c > 0,
whereas the reverse is true if c > 110 . In this paper we show that the optimal threat is to tell
A that in the event it does not participate, the seller keeps the invention with probability
1
2 , and makes it open source with probability
1
2 . Faced with this lottery, then company As
expected outside payo¤ is 50; 000 500; 000c: Then, as we show,3 the best that the seller can
do is ask a price of $450,000. Firm A always(!) agrees to buy the invention at the asking
price of $450,000, since 500; 000   500; 000c   450; 000 = 50; 000   500; 000c and hence its
payo¤ is (weakly) greater than its outside option. Thus, the open source option, even though
is never implemented, has an extraordinary e¤ect on the revenue maximizing allocation. It
guarantees a higher expected revenue ($450,000), and makes the mechanism e¢ cient. This
is one of the main economic messages of this paper: when outside options depend on the
buyersprivate information, the seller can increase both revenue and e¢ ciency by designing
appropriate outside options. If the payo¤ from open sourcing did not depend on A0s cost
parameter, then the allocation of the invention at the optimal mechanism would have been
identical, and as ine¢ cient, as in the case where open sourcing were not an option.4 This
example highlights the crucial role of outside options on the degree of e¢ ciency of revenue
maximizing mechanisms when outside payo¤s are type-dependent.
Myerson (1981) studies revenue maximizing mechanisms of a single unit in an indepen-
dent private value environment, where each buyers outside option is a constant that is
independent from the outcome of the auction. This seminal contribution establishes that at
a revenue maximizing auction the seller gives the good to the buyer with the highest virtual
surplus, whenever this virtual surplus is above the sellers valuation. Because a buyers
virtual surplus is equal to his valuation minus information rents, optimal auctions are inef-
2Both of these threats are credible. In case rm A does not participate in the sale, the seller is indi¤erent
between keeping the invention and making it open source, and since there is nothing else the seller can do
in that case, both these options are optimal.
3This example is, essentially, the one that is formally analyzed in section 5.2.
4 If A0s payo¤ from open sourcing were independent of its type, say it were  $100; 000; then, from the
work of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) we know that the developer by threatening company A to
make the invention open source, can extract payments even if company A does not get the technology, so
long as it does not become open source. In this case the optimal auction will have an entry fee of $100,000
and a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of $250,000. Company A will get the new technology when its cost is below 1
2
.
Now the expected revenue for the developer will be higher and it will be $225,000, but the optimal auction
is ine¢ cient, since there is trade only half the time, exactly as in the case without the open sourcing option.
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cient, even when buyers are ex-ante symmetric.5 Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stachetti (1996),
JMS96, examine revenue maximizing mechanisms of a single object, where as in Myerson
(1981), each buyers outside option is a constant, but with the important di¤erence that the
outside option depends on the allocation of the object. The new insight of JMS96 is that
the seller increases revenue by choosing the appropriate outside options. In JMS96 because
outside options are type-independent the revenue maximizing allocation of the good is never
a¤ected by the outside options that buyers face. Only payments are a¤ected. Therefore,
the kind of ine¢ ciencies that appear in Myerson (1981) are still present. A more recent
paper with type-independent externalities is Ase¤ and Chade (2006).
In this paper we study revenue maximizing auctions when outside options can depend
on buyerstypes, and show that the revenue maximizing allocation of the goods crucially
depends on the shape of the outside options that buyers face. The reason for this is that
with type-dependent outside options the virtual surplus of an allocation is modied to
account for the shape of the outside options. The shape of the outside options, together
with the allocation mechanism determine the critical types, that is the types where the
participation constraints bind. The modied virtual surplusof an allocation can be equal
or strictly greater than its actual surplus. Depending on how the modied virtual surplus
of an allocation compares to its actual surplus, a revenue maximizing mechanism can be
ex-post e¢ cient, as is the example in Section 5.2, or it may be oversellingcompared to
the ex-post e¢ cient level, as in the example presented in Section 5.1.
The dependence of the modied virtual surpluson the allocation through the vector
of critical types makes the problem sometimes non-linear. Hence, a general, analytical
solution seems intractable. Because of the possible nonlinearities, this problem is similar to
Maskin and Riley (1984), who study revenue maximizing auctions with risk averse buyers.
Fortunately, here we are able to identify a large class of environments where the problem
becomes linear, as it is in Myerson (1981). In these cases, the vector of critical types does
not depend on the allocation that the seller chooses, because, (roughly), buyersoutside
payo¤s have extreme slopes. The analytical solutions of these cases show the possibilities of
e¢ ciency and overselling.We choose to state these results as possibilities, rather then to
describe the complete list of cases where they would be true, because this seems like a very
long and tedious task. Whether e¢ ciency, oversellingor undersellingoccurs depends
on the vector of critical types. These features will be present also when revenue depends
non-linearly in the assignment rule:
It is very important to stress that the virtual surplus is modied only when outside-
payo¤s are type-dependent. Thus, overselling cannot occur when there are externalities,
(positive or negative), but the outside options are at,6 as is the case in JMS96. Also the
presence of externalities is just one instance where outside options may be type-dependent,
5This is because it is possible that the highest virtual surplus, (valuation minus information rents), is
below the sellers valuation, whereas the highest valuation is above.
6This point is elaborated at the end of Section 6.1.
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there can be many more, think for instance, a procurement setting where bidders have to
give up the possibility of undertaking other projects in order to participate in the current
auction.
Our model allows for an elegant description of a large number of allocation problems
because it allows for multiple heterogeneous goods, type-dependent outside options and
externalities; as well as for the goods to be simultaneously complements for some buyers,
and substitutes for others. We now list a few of the potential applications of our model.
 Allocation of rights to a new technology. Our analysis could o¤er useful insights on the
debate about how new technologies or ideas should be sold. In the example just discussed,
we saw the crucial role of the presence of the open source option on the e¢ ciency properties
of the revenue maximizing mechanisms: it increased both revenue and e¢ ciency. This is an
important area, since the way property rights are assigned on new ideas and technologies
does not only a¤ect the way the particular ideas will be implemented in practice, but also
the incentives to produce new ones.
 Auctioning of advertisement slots on the internet, TV or radio. Airtime for advertise-
ments on TV and radio is often priced using conventional mechanisms. However, exploiting
the presence of externalities is not far from what we already observe in reality. In Germany
during the soccer world cup, advertisement slots were sold by category. For instance, a slot
was allocated only to brewing companies. Then a potential buyer knew a priori that if it
did not buy the slot, it will go to a competitor. Nowadays, companies like Yahoo! and
Google auction-o¤ their advertising slots and are thinking of optimal ways to do so. Our
model ts very well many aspects of the problem these companies face: they are selling
many advertising slots that can be heterogeneous, some slots may be substitutes and some
complements of one another, and clearly buyers care about the slots that their competitors
obtain.
 Team formation. Our model can be used to study a type of procurement auction where
the buyer is an organization, (consulting rm, sports team), that wants to hire individuals
to perform a task as a team. The compensation that an individual requires depends on
who else will join the team. For instance, if individuals joining consist of gurus in the eld,
someone may consider the experience of working with such people so important, that he
may be willing to participate with minimal compensation. On the other hand, if team
members are of very poor quality the compensation that he requires may be higher.7
 Optimal auction design with endogenous market structure. Our model captures sce-
narios of auctions with endogenous market structure and generalizes previous work by Dana
and Spier (1994), and Milgrom (1996).8
7These insights can be useful when one thinks about academic hiring. Clearly academics care a lot about
the quality of their colleagues in absolute sense, and also relatively, meaning how good is the match.
8Gale (1990) also considers a variation of this problem but because he imposes a very strong super-
additivity condition to the prot function, he shows that an optimal mechanism always gives all the permits
to at most one buyer, so the market structure is always a monopoly.
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Other applications include rm take-overs,9 allocation of airport take-o¤ and landing
slots, and optimal bundling. We nish with a historical application.
 A historical example. The praetorian guard realized the additional benets of running
an auction when negative externalities are present. In the year 196 A.D. they killed the
emperor Pertinax and, making a break with tradition,decided not to hand over the title
to someone else for a xed price, but to run an auction. Historians10 cite the fact that there
was heavy overbidding, since participants were afraid that in case of not winning the auction,
they would be killed by the next emperor, since they would be potential conspirators. This
is an example of extreme negative externalities! The experiment was successful from the
point of view of the guard, since the auction generated very high revenue, but was not
repeated, probably since Didius Iulianus (the winner) lasted only 65 days as emperor and
was killed after that, making next bidders reluctant to participate in another auction of this
sort.
To summarize, our model is tractable, despite its generality, and has a very large num-
ber of potential applications. Our main message is that when outside options are type-
dependent the revenue maximizing assignment of the objects will depend on them. The
seller can then increase both revenue and e¢ ciency by choosing the appropriate outside
options. This issue seems to be known to practitioners, as it is suggested by the design
of the UK spectrum auctions,11 see for instance Klemperer (2004). Moreover, our solution
technique of analyzing type-dependent outside options can be useful in models where type-
dependent outside options arise endogenously, because buyers can collude or because there
are competing sellers.
Other papers that study optimal multi-unit auctions when private information is sin-
gle dimensional are Maskin and Riley (1989), who analyze the case of unit demands and
continuously divisible goods, Gale (1990) who analyzes the case of discrete goods and super-
additive valuations and, nally, Levin (1997) the case of complements. As in these papers,
uncertainty in our model is single dimensional and buyers are risk neutral, but we allow
for many goods, (that can be bundled any way the seller likes), multi-unit demands and
payo¤ functions that allow for complements, substitutes and externalities. A number of
papers on optimal multi-unit auctions model types as being multidimensional. With multi-
dimensional types the characterization of the optimum is extremely di¢ cult. Signicant
progress has been made, but no analytical solution, nor general algorithm is known. Impor-
tant contributions there are Armstrong (2000), Avery and Hendershott (2000) and Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2001). This paper is less general in the dimensionality of the types, but
9Externalities are of huge importance in rm take-overs: Recently (February 2004), Cingular bought
AT&T wireless for $41 billion after a bidding war with Vodafone. Some perceive that the big winner of
this sale will be Verizon even though it was not a participant in the auction (NY Times February 17, 2004
Verizon Wireless May Benet From Results of Auction).
10This is stated by Edward Gibbon, (1737-94), English historian, in his book "The History of the Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire."
11We are grateful to Sushil Bikhchandani for pointing this out.
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much more general in all other dimensions.
This paper is also related to the literature on mechanism design with type-dependent
outside options and most notably to the paper by Krishna and Perry (2000) who examine
e¢ cient mechanisms, whereas our focus is revenue maximization. Jehiel-Moldovanu (2001b)
are also concerned with the design of e¢ cient mechanisms. Lewis and Sappington (1989)
study an agency problem where the outside option of the agent is type-dependent. Among
other things, the fact that the critical type is not necessarily the worst one mitigates
the ine¢ ciencies that arise from contracting under private information. This feature also
appears sometimes in our analysis, but we also show that sometimes ine¢ ciencies are not
reduced, but they change in nature, and the monopolist instead of selling too little, she
sells too much. Jullien (2000) uses a dual approach to characterize properties of the optimal
incentive scheme such as the possibility of separation, non-stochasticity, etc. In this paper
we do not rely on dual methods. Other di¤erences from Jullien are that we allow for multiple
agents and for the principle to choose the outside options that agents face.
Externalities, and hence outside options, are also type dependent in Jehiel-Moldovanu
and Stacchetti (1999), JMS99, who consider the design of optimal auctions of a single
unit in the presence of type-dependent externalities and multi-dimensional types. A buyers
type is a vector, where each component indicates his/her utility as a function of who gets
the object. In JMS99 the multi-dimensionality of types makes the solution of the general
problem intractable.12
We conclude with a brief outline of our paper. In Section 2 we introduce the model.
Our analysis starts in Section 3 by establishing properties of feasible mechanisms, that is
mechanisms that satisfy incentive, voluntary participation, and resource constraints. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes revenue maximizing mechanisms. In Section 5 we present two largely
self contained examples. A reader can get a avor of our ndings by looking directly at
these examples.
2. The model
A risk neutral seller owns N indivisible, possibly heterogeneous, objects that are of 0 value
to her and faces I risk-neutral buyers. Both N and I are nite natural numbers. The seller
(indexed by zero) can bundle these N objects in any way she sees t. An allocation z is an
assignment of objects to the buyers and to the seller. It is a vector with N components,
where each component stands for an object and it species who gets it, therefore the set
of possible allocations is nite and given by Z  [I [ f0g]N . Buyer is valuation from
12JMS (1999) restrict attention auctions where (1) the buyers submit scalar bids and (2) the seller transfers
the object to one of the buyers for sure, and show that a second-price auction is an optimal mechanism among
this class. They also slightly relax the for sure sale assumption, by allowing for reserve prices and show
that with two buyers, this auction remains optimal.
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allocation z is denoted by zi (ci; c i) and it depends on buyer i
0s cost parameter ci and
on the cost parameters of all the other buyers c i. Values are therefore interdependent.
Buyer is cost parameter ci is private information and is distributed on Ci = [ci; ci], with
0  ci  ci <1, according to a distribution Fi that has a strictly positive and continuous
density fi. All buyerstypes are independently distributed. We use f(c) = i2Ifi(ci); where
c 2 C = i2ICi and f i(c i) = j2I
j 6=i
fj(cj).
We assume that, for all i 2 I, zi (; c i) is decreasing, convex and di¤erentiable for all
z and c i: We impose no restrictions on how i depends on z nor c i. This formulation
allows for buyers to be demanding many objects, which may be complements or substitutes,
and for externalities, that can be type and identity dependent. It is very well possible that
zi (ci; c i) 6= 0 even when the allocation z does not include any objects for i. An instance
of that, is a situation where buyers are rms competing in di¤erent markets, and whatever
happens in the current sale will a¤ect their positioning and interaction relative to the other
buyers in other markets. More importantly, an allocation may a¤ect buyer i even if he is
not taking part in the auction, which implies that non-participation payo¤s may depend
on i0s type. Type-dependent non-participation payo¤s are the key force behind our new
insights.
The objective of the seller is to design a mechanism that maximizes expected revenue,
and buyers aim to maximize expected surplus.
Mechanisms
By the revelation principle it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to truth-
telling equilibria of direct revelation games where all buyers participate. To see this, note
that the set of possible allocations is Z = fI [ f0ggN ; which is larger, the more buyers
participate. The seller can then replicate an equilibrium outcome of some auction, where
a subset of the buyers for some realizations of their private information do not participate,
with a mechanism where all these buyers participate, and by mapping their corresponding
reports to the allocation that would have prevailed at the equilibrium of the original auction
game.
A direct revelation mechanism,(DRM), M = (p; x) consists of an assignment rule p :
C  ! (Z) and a payment rule x : C  ! RI .
The assignment rule species the probability of each allocation for a given vector of
reports. We denote by pz(c) the probability that allocation z is implemented when the
vector of reports is c. Observe that the assignment rule has as many components as the
number of possible allocations. The payment rule x species, for each vector of reports c;
a vector of payments, one for each buyer.
Non-Participation Assignment Rules
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In the event that a buyer i does not participate in the mechanism, then his payo¤ is
determined by the allocation that prevails when he is not around, which we denote by
p i: A non-participation assignment rule species a p i for each i 2 I. We are assuming
that the seller has the commitment power to choose the non-participation assignment rule,
in such a way, as to maximize ex-ante expected revenue.13 The seller chooses p i out of
P i = fp i : C i ! (Z i)g, where Z i  Z is the set of allocations that are feasible
without i: If the seller does not have such commitment power, then P i contains all the
assignment rules that are feasible and optimal when i is not around (therefore P i  fp i :
C i ! (Z i)g). It is worth stressing, that the qualitative features of our results depend
on the fact that outside payo¤s are type dependent, and not on whether the seller has the
power to choose p i or not.
We now proceed to describe the sellers and the buyerspayo¤s.
Payo¤s from Participation
The interim expected utility of a buyer of type ci when he participates and declares c0i
is
Ui(ci; c
0
i; (p; x)) = Ec i
"X
z2Z
(pz(c0i; c i)
z
i (ci; c i))  xi(c0i; c i)
#
:
Let also Vi(ci)  Ui(ci; ci; (p; x)):
Payo¤s from Non-Participation
The payo¤ that accrues to buyer i from non participation depends on what allocations
will prevail in that case, which are determined by p i, and on his type ci, and it is given by
U i(ci; p
 i) = Ec i
24 X
z2Z i
(p i)z(c i)zi (ci; c i)
35 ;
where (p i)z denotes the probability assigned to allocation z by p i. The fact that i0s non-
participation payo¤s depend on his type is arguably the most crucial feature of our model.
13This is also the assumption in JMS96. In that paper there is a single object for sale, and constant with
respect to type, outside options.
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For an illustration of participation and non-participation payo¤s, see Figure 1.
Participation / Non-Participation Payoffs
Payoff to buyer i
ic
)( ii cV
Shape depends on
),( iii pcU
-
Shape depends on ip -
p
Figure 1
We proceed to describe the timing
Timing
Stage 0: The seller chooses a mechanism (p; x) and p i; for all i:
Stage 1: Buyers decide whether to participate or not, and which report to
make. If all make a report, the mechanism determines the assignment of objects
and the payments. If buyer i decides not to participate, the objects are assigned
according to fp ig: If more than one buyers fail to participate, we assume that
the seller keeps the objects.
In order for a mechanism to be feasible it must be the case that all buyers choose to
participate and to report their true type. We are capturing a one-shot scenario. Given that
others participate and tell the truth about their types, is it a best response for buyer i to
participate and tell the truth about his type? In such a one-shot scenario, buyers are not
making inferences about the types of buyer i in the event that buyer i does not participate.
We now provide a formal denition of what it entails for a direct revelation mechanism
to be feasible.
Feasible Mechanisms
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Denition 1. (Feasible Mechanisms) For a given non-participation assignment rule,
(p i)i2I ; we say that a mechanism (p; x) is feasible i¤ it satises
(IC) incentive constraints,a buyers strategy is such that
Ui(ci; ci; (p; x))  Ui(ci; c0i; (p; x)) for all ci; c0i 2 Ci; and i 2 I
(PC) voluntary participation constraints,
Ui(ci; ci; (p; x))  U i(ci; p i) for all ci 2 Ci; and i 2 I
(RES) resource constraints
P
z2Z
pz(c) = 1; pz(c)  0 for all c 2 C
Summarizing, feasibility requires that p and x are such that buyers (1) prefer to tell the
truth about their cost parameter, (2) buyers choose voluntarily to participate in the mech-
anism and (3) p is a probability distribution over Z.14 We now state the sellers problem.
The Sellers Problem
With the help of the revelation principle the sellers problem can be written as
max
Z
C
IX
i=1
xi(c)f(c)dc (1)
subject to (p; x) being feasible.
This completes the description of our model and the sellers problem. We proceed with
the analysis of it. Proofs of the results not presented in the main text can be found in the
Appendix A.
3. Implications of Incentive and Participation Constraints
The sellers objective is to maximize expected revenue subject to incentive, participation
and resource constraints. This section studies implications of these constraints.
Implications of Incentive Compatibility
Given a DRM (p; x) buyer i0s maximized payo¤,
Vi(ci) = max
c0i
Z
C i
 X
z2Z
pz(c0i; c i)
z
i (ci; c i)  xi(c0i; c i)
!
f i(c i)dc i; (2)
is convex, since it is a maximum of convex functions. In the next Lemma we show that the
incentive constraints translate into the requirement that the derivative of Vi
Pi(ci) 
Z
C i
X
z2Z
pz(ci; c i)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i; (3)
14Notice that Z contains the allocation where the seller keeps all the objects, thus
P
z2Z
pz(c) = 1:
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(more precisely a selection from its subgradient, which is single valued almost surely),
evaluated at the true type is weakly increasing.15
Lemma 1 A mechanism (p; x) is incentive compatible i¤
Pi(c
0
i)  Pi(ci) for all c0i > ci (4)
Vi(ci) = Vi(ci) 
ciR
ci
Pi(s)ds for all ci 2 Ci: (5)
With the help of Lemma 1 and using standard arguments, we can write buyer is ex-
pected payment as a function of the assignment rule p, and the payo¤ that accrues to his
worst type,16 Vi(ci)Z
C
xi(c)f(c)dc =
Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(ci; c i)

zi (ci; c i) +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci

f(c)dc  Vi(ci):
Let
Jz(c) 
IX
i=1
[zi (ci; c i) +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci
]
denote the virtual surplus of allocation z: Notice that we are summing over all buyers
because an allocation may a¤ect all of them, and not just the ones that obtain objects.
Therefore the virtual surplus of allocation z may depend on the whole vector of types.17
Using this denition, the sellers objective function can be rewritten as
IX
i=1
Z
C
xi(c)f(c)dc =
Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)Jz(c)f(c)dc 
IX
i=1
Vi(ci): (6)
Now we turn to examine the implications of the participation constraints.
Implications of Participation Constraints
Since the sellers revenue is decreasing in Vi(ci); at a solution this term must be as small
as possible subject to the participation constraint Vi(ci)  U i(ci; p i) for all ci 2 Ci. This
observation implies that there will be at least one type ci where Vi(ci) = U i(ci; p
 i): We
call this the critical type of i and denote it by ci (p; p
 i): In the event that there is more
15 In the classical case, where there is only one object and i0s payo¤ from obtaining the object is vi; (see
Myerson (1981)), the analog of Pi is Pi(vi) =
R
V i
p(vi; v i)f i(v i)dv i.
16For more details see Appendix.
17 In Myerson (1981) virtual valuations are buyer-specic. For buyer i we have Ji(vi) = vi   1 Fi(vi)fi(vi) , (vi
is is valuation for the object).
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than one type where Vi(ci) = U i(ci; p
 i); then any one of them will do. From (5) we have
that Vi(ci) =constant 
ciR
ci
Pi(s)ds), so ci must be such that
ci (p; p
 i) 2 argmin
ci

 
Z ci
ci
Pi(s)ds  U i(ci; p i)

: (7)
See Figure 2.
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Note that (7) implies that if ci is interior, Vi and U i must be tangent at c

i ; namely it must
be the case that
@U i(c

i ; p
 i)
@ci
2 @Vi(ci ): (8)
If we are at a corner, that is ci = ci then it must be the case that
@U i(ci;p
 i)
@ci
 dVi(ci)dci , and
if we are at ci = ci then it must hold that
@U i(ci;p
 i)
@ci
 dVi(ci)dci . Moreover, (7) implies that
at ci we have that
Vi(c

i ) = U i(c

i ; p
 i) (9)
and from a generalization of the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (see Krishna and Maen-
ner (2001)), and incentive compatibility, it follows that
Vi(ci) = U i(c

i (p; p
 i); p i) +
ciZ
ci (p;p i)
Pi(s)ds: (10)
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From (10) we see that Vi(ci) depends on p through two channels: Pi and ci (p; p
 i):
Moreover, as already discussed, p i is often chosen by the seller in order to minimize
Vi(ci), namely
p i(p) 2 arg min
 i2P i
U i(c

i (p; 
 i);  i) +
ciZ
ci (p; i)
Pi(s)ds: (11)
For each assignment of the objects, p, there is a potentially di¤erent optimal threatp i(p);
which can be random. The dependence of p i on p adds an additional level of complication.
By substituting a solution of the program described in (11) into (10), we have that at
an optimum it must be the case that
Vi(ci; p; p
 i(p)) = U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i) +
ciZ
ci (p;p i(p))
Pi(s)ds: (12)
Modied Virtual Surpluses
We now proceed to demonstrate how the presence of type-dependent outside options
modies the virtual surpluses of allocations. By substituting (12) into (6), the objective
function of the sellers problem can be rewritten as
Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)Jz(c)f(c)dc 
IX
i=1
264U i(ci (p; p i(p)); p i) + ciZ
ci (p;p i(p))
Pi(s)ds
375 : (13)
Recalling that Pi(ci) =
R
C i
P
z2Z
pz(c)
@zi (ci;c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i; and by rearranging the terms in
(13), we can rewrite it asZ
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)
"
Jz(c) 
IX
i=1
1cici (p;p i(p))
@zi (c)
@ci
1
fi(ci)
#
f(c)dc 
IX
i=1
U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i):
We dene the modied virtual surplus of allocation z by
J^z(c)  Jz(c) 
IX
i=1
1cici (p;p i(p))
@zi (c)
@ci
1
fi(ci)
: (14)
Observe that the modied virtual surplus depends on p and on p i through ci (p; p
 i(p)),
which depends on the shape of the participation payo¤s, which are determined by p; and
on the shape of non-participation payo¤s, which are determined by fp igi2I :
It is useful to compare the modied virtual surplus of an allocation z, J^z; with the
virtual surplus of that allocation, Jz; and with the actual surplus of that allocation Sz;
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which is given by Sz(c) =
IP
i=1
zi (ci; c i). This is interesting because the degree of e¢ ciency
of a revenue maximizing mechanism depends on these comparisons.
If ci = ci for all i the modied virtual surplus coincides with the virtual surplus hence
J^z(c) = Jz(c): (15)
This is because the virtual surplus is modied only for ci  ci : The condition ci = ci
for all i holds when outside options are type-independent as is the case in in Myerson
(1981) and in JMS96. To see this, note that if outside options are type-independent and
equal to U i(p
 i) for all ci; then because Vi(ci) is decreasing in ci it is follows immediately
that the participation constraint will be binding at the highest cost type, namely ci = ci;
irrespectively of the exact shape of Vi; which depends on p: For an illustration see Figure
3.
Payoff from participating: shape
depends on p
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1c
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If on the other hand, ci = ci for all i; then
18
J^z(c) = Jz(c) 
IX
i=1
@zi (c)
@ci
1
fi(ci)
; (16)
which can be rewritten as
J^z(c) =
IX
i=1

zi (ci; c i) +
Fi(ci)  1
fi(ci)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci

: (17)
18This is the case in the example we study in subsection 5.1.
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In this case J^z(c) > Jz(c) because
IP
i=1
@zi (c)
@ci
1
fi(ci)
is negative, which follows from the fact
that zi is decreasing in ci. Moreover, since the amount

Fi(ci) 1
fi(ci)
@zi (ci;c i)
@ci

is positive, we
also have that the modied virtual surplus of allocation z; is actually larger than the
actual surplus of allocation z, that is J^z(c)  Sz(c).
Finally, when ci is interior
19 for all i, namely ci 2 (ci; ci); then depending on how a
vector (ci; c i) compares to (ci ; c

 i); J^z di¤ers. Take for instance a (~ci; ~c i), where for all
i we have that ~ci < ci ; then it holds that J^z(~c) = Jz(~c), as in (15), and at that ~c the
modied virtual surplus is less than Sz(c^): Now take a (c^i; c^ i), where for all i we have that
c^i  ci ; then it holds that J^z(c^) = Jz(c^) 
IP
i=1
@zi (c^)
@ci
1
fi(c^i)
; as in (16), and at c^ we have that
J^z(c^) > Jz(c^) and J^z(c^)  Sz(c^): For a vector (ci; c i) where ci > ci for some i; and cj  cj
for some j, we can see from (14), there is not modication to Jz for j, but there is for i:
Then we can still conclude that J^z(c)  Jz(c); but depending on the exact comparison of
(ci; c i) with (ci ; c

 i) both J^z(c)  Sz(c) and J^z(c) < Sz(c) are possible.
How the modied virtual surplus of an allocation, (the J^z); with the actual virtual
surplus of that allocation, (the Sz); is important because, as we will see later, it a¤ects
the degree of e¢ ciency of the revenue maximizing mechanisms, which are studied in the
following section.
4. Optimal Mechanisms
Here we put together all the implications we have derived in the previous section, and
describe the conditions revenue maximizing mechanisms satisfy.
Using (14) the sellers objective function given by (13) can be rewritten asZ
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)J^z(c)f(c)dc 
IX
i=1
U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i): (18)
The following Proposition characterizes the problem solved by revenue maximizing
mechanisms.
Proposition 2 If in a mechanism (p; x) the assignment function p satises resource con-
straints, (4), and maximizes (18), with ci (p; p
 i) given by (7), and the payment function x
for all i is given by:
xi(c) =
X
z2Z
pz(c)zi (c) +
ciZ
ci
X
z2Z
pz(s; c i)
@zi (s; c i)
@s
ds  Vi(ci; p; p i(p)); (19)
with Vi(ci; p; p i(p)) given by (12), then the mechanism is optimal.
19This is the case in the example we study in subsection 5.2.
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Proof. We have already argued why at an optimal mechanism, there must exists at list
one type for each buyer where the participation constraint binds. We have called this type
ci (p; p
 i), and it satises (7). With the help of (7) we got (9). These two equations are
implications of the participation constraints on the solutions.
The implications of the incentive constraints are that revenue can be expressed as in
(6). Combining this, with the implications of the participation constraints, namely (7) and
(9) we showed how we can express revenue by (18).
Now in order for a mechanism to be a valid solution it must have an allocation rule p^
that satises (4), and resource constraints.
Finally, if in a mechanism the payment rule is given (19), then for all i 2 I; i0s payo¤
given p and p i(p) subject to the participation constraints is minimized, since the type ci
is indi¤erent between participation or not. To see this, note that by substituting (12) into
(19), and taking expectations with respect to c i; we obtain thatZ
C i
xi(c)f i(c i)dc i =
Z
C i
24X
z2Z
pz(c)zi (c) +
ciZ
ci
X
z2Z
pz(s; c i)
@zi (s; c i)
@s
ds
35 f i(c i)dc i
 U i(ci (p; p i(p)); p i) 
ciZ
ci (p;p i(p))
Pi(s)ds: (20)
By recalling (3), (20) implies that
Vi(ci) = U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i) 
ci (p;p
 i(p))Z
ci
Pi(s)ds;
from which we immediately get that
Vi(c

i ) = U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i):
From these considerations it follows that a mechanism (p; x) that satises all these
conditions is optimal.
Note that Proposition 2 is analogous to Lemma 3 in Myerson (1981). As in that paper,
we have revenue equivalence. Any two mechanisms that allocate the objects in the same
way and give the same expected payo¤ to the worst type, generate the same revenue. There
are however, important di¤erences. The most important one is that in our problem the
objective function can depend non-linearly on p. The reason is that c0i s may depend on
non-linearly on p directly and through p i(p), and revenue depends on ci through J^z; and
the term
IP
i=1
U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i):
In Myerson (1981) and JMS (1996) ci is always equal to ci for all i because non-
participation payo¤s are independent of types: This implies that the modied virtual surplus
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is equal to the virtual surplus and independent of the assignment rule p: In this case, a
revenue maximizing p is independent of the outside options that buyers face, and it has a
simple characterization, because revenue is always linear in p: This is true even if, as in this
paper and in JMS (1996), the seller can choose p i: The reason is that, when outside options
give a type-independent payo¤, they are essentially just a number. All the seller needs to
do is to choose the option that guarantees the lowest number for i. In that case optimal
threats p i are independent of p and deterministic. In contrast, with type-dependent outside
options p i can depend on p, can be random and cannot be chosen by simple inspection,
as we illustrate in Example 5.2.
From the previous discussion, it is clear the impossibility of nding an analytical expres-
sion for p0s that maximizes (13) for all cases because the sellers objective function is non-
linear20 in p. Fortunately, the problem has enough structure to allow the use of variational
methods. In particular, if the functions zi (; c i) are smooth enough, then ci (p; p i(p)) is a
di¤erentiable function of p, thus guaranteeing that the objective function is di¤erentiable,
and hence continuous. It is not hard to show that the feasible set is sequentially compact.
A continuous function over a sequentially compact set has a maximum. The solution will
depend on the particular shapes of zi and of the distributions Fi: This environment is more
complicated than the ones considered by Jullien (2000), because there are multiple agents
and the seller can choose the outside options. However in Figueroa and Skreta (2005) we
show that the problem often, (but not always), reduces to one with essentially exogenous
non-participation assignment rules. Unfortunately, the di¢ culties arising from having a
non-linear objective function remain. In that respect, Proposition 2 is analogous to Theo-
rem 8 in Maskin and Riley (1984), who characterize revenue maximizing auctions with risk
averse buyers. As here, in that paper too, the non-linear nature of the program prohibits
an analytical expression in general.
Fortunately, we are able to identify interesting sub-classes of problems where the problem
becomes linear and hence analytical solutions can be obtained through a procedure similar
to the one used in Myerson (1981). As we later argue, these classes of problems are by
themselves economically relevant, and allow us to analyze the qualitative e¤ects that type-
dependent outside options have on revenue maximizing mechanisms, and to compare them
to the particular case of type-independent ones. This by no means implies that they are the
only relevant ones, but their analytical tractability is used to illuminate the more general
role of outside options on the shape of revenue maximizing mechanisms.
4.1 Optimal Mechanisms when Revenue is Linear in p
Whether the problem turns out to be linear or not, depends on how sensitive the outside
payo¤ of a buyer is with respect to his own type, relative to the sensitiveness of the payo¤s
20The objective function is non-linear in p when ci (p; p
 i(p)) depends on p. For an example see Appendix
B.
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received if the buyer actually participates. Many cases with interesting economic insights
turn out to be linear, as we illustrate in our examples in Section 5. They include the
case where outside options can depend on p and on the type of competitors, but not on the
buyers type. They also include the somewhat opposite polar case, where the outside option
depends very strongly on the buyers type, and an intermediate case where both options are
present: the buyer can be threatened with an allocation that yields him a type independent
payo¤, and with an allocation where the payo¤ is very sensitive to type.
We start by describing under what circumstances revenue will be linear in p. In one
sentence, revenue is linear in p in cases where ci does not depend on p; when p
 i is chosen
optimally. This can occur in many cases, like the three ones we just described. We analyze
them in detail in what follows, since they su¢ ce to illustrate the main economic insights
of the inuence of outside options in the shape of revenue maximizing mechanisms. It is
important to stress that all the conditions that we will be discussing are imposed only on
the shape of iz(; c i) with z 2 Z i.
4.1.1 Environments where Revenue is Linear in p
We now present the three environments described before. A more detailed description can
be found in Appendix C.
In what follows we use the notation:
zi (ci) 
Z
C i
zi (ci; c i)f i(c i)dc i:
Case 1: Flat Payo¤ from Worst Allocation for i
Suppose that there is an allocation in zFi 2 Z i; that gives i a type-independent payo¤
and satises (with some abuse of notation)

zFi
i (c i)  zi (ci; c i) for all z 2 Z i and ci 2 Ci:
Then, an optimal outside option from the sellers perspective, is (p i)zFi = 1, since it solves,
for all p
p i(p) 2 arg min
 i2P i
U i(c

i (p; 
 i);  i) +
ciZ
ci (p; i)
Pi(s)ds (21)
In that case we have (see Figure 3)
ci (p; p
 i(p)) = ci and (22)
U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i(p)) = z
F
i
i (ci):
Environments that fall in this category are in Myerson (1981) and in JMS (1996).
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Case 2: Very Steep Payo¤ from Worst Allocation for i
Another case, is the polar opposite of the previous one. Here the worst allocation for
buyer i is type dependent, and very sharply so. More precisely, there exists an allocation
zSi 2 Z i, at which i0s payo¤ is very sensitive to type, and guarantees the lowest payo¤ at
ci:
21
d
zSi
i (ci)
dci
 d
z
i (ci)
dci
for all z 2 Z

zSi
i (ci)  zi (ci) for all z 2 Z:
It is easy to see (the details are in Appendix C) that the optimal outside option from the
sellers perspective is (p i)zSi = 1 for all p, since it solves, for all p,
p i(p) 2 arg min
 i2P i
U i(c

i (p; 
 i);  i) +
ciZ
ci (p; i)
Pi(s)ds; (23)
In that case we have (see Figure 4)
ci (p; p
 i(p)) = ci and (24)
U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i(p)) = z
S
i
i (ci).
21Such a case is illustrated in Scenario 2 in Section 5.1.
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Case 3: Coexistence of Flat and Very Steep Worst Allocations for i
Another interesting case is the one where options like zSi and z
F
i coexist, and it is not
obvious which one should be used by the seller, because
d
zSi
i (ci)
dci
 d
z
i (ci)
dci
 d
zFi
i (ci)
dci
for all z 2 Z; ci 2 Ci

zSi
i (ci)  
zFi
i (ci)
21
As one can see from Figure 5, for some types, zFi hurts more, and for others z
S
i .
Buyer’s
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In this case22, the solution to
p i(p) 2 arg min
 i2P i
 iz
F
i
i (c

i ) + (1   i)z
S
i
i (c

i ) +
ciZ
ci
Pi(s)ds; (25)
is such that
ci (p; p
 i(p)) = c^i and (26)
U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i(p)) = z
F
i
i (c^i) = 
zSi
i (c^i) for all p and p
 i(p)
where c^i is the type where the payo¤s cross, that is

zFi
i (c^i) = 
zSi
i (c^i): (27)
In this case, the critical type is always the same, but the optimal p i depends on the
assignment rule that the seller wishes to implement.
22Such a scenario is illustrated in Section 5.2.
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Summing up, in all the cases23 described so far neither ci (p; p
 i(p)) nor the level of
U i(:; p
 i(p)) evaluated at the critical type ci , depend on p. This is despite the fact that p
 i
can depend on p:24 This means that for every possible assignment rule p, when the seller
chooses p i 2 P i optimally, that is according to (11), the following are true25
ci  ci (p; p i(p)) and (28)
U i(c

i )  U i(ci ; p i(p)):
Proposition 3 If (28) is satised, the sellers expected revenue can be expressed as a linear
function of the assignment rule,Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)J^z(c)f(c)dc 
IX
i=1
U i(c

i );
where J^z is the modied virtual surplus of allocation z dened in (14):
4.1.2 Analysis of the Problem when Revenue is Linear in p
When Proposition 3 holds, we can break the characterization of revenue maximizing mech-
anisms into two steps: rst nd an optimal non-participation assignment rule fp i(p)gi2I ,
as we have done in (21), (23), or (25), and then nd an optimal assignment rule p that
solves:
max
p2(Z)
Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)J^z(c)f(c)dc (29)
s:t: Pi increasing:
This problem has a similar structure to the classical one in Myerson (1981), but with
modied virtual surpluses, and can be solved using relatively conventional methods. Despite
this, the solution will often exhibit stark di¤erences from the solution to the classical one.
The solution is straightforward if the assignment rule that solves the relaxed program
max
p2(Z)
Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)J^z(c)f(c)dc
also satises the requirement of Pi being increasing, since in that case, the relaxed program
can be solved by pointwise maximization. Following Myerson (1981) we will refer to this as
23These are not the only cases where revenue will be linear in p; but they are suggestive on what classes
of environments are likely to exhibit this property.
24This occurs in the cases where ci is interior and p
 i must also satisfy (8).
25Notice that if p i is exogenous (P i is a singleton) the second requirement is trivially satised.
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the regular case. On the other hand, in the general case, pointwise optimization will lead
to a mechanism that may not be feasible.
In the classical problem, a su¢ cient condition for the problem to be regular is that the
virtual surpluses are increasing. A mild condition on the distribution function Fi (MHR)
guarantees that. Unfortunately, in our more general environment the problem fails to be
regular even if virtual surpluses, (or modied virtual surpluses), are monotonic, so Myersons
technique of obtaining ironedvirtual valuations will not work. In Figueroa and Skreta
(2007) we illustrate this phenomenon in a concrete example and show a way to solve the
general case, which does not impose additional assumptions, such as di¤erentiability, on
the mechanism. There we argue that in the general case an optimal mechanism will involve
randomizations between allocations. Such lotteries are quite surprising given that buyers
are risk neutral and types are single dimensional.
We now state a condition which guarantees that pointwise optimization will lead to a
feasible solution. This condition generalizes the one in Myerson (1981), since with indepen-
dent private values and linear utility functions our condition is satised whenever MHR is
satised.
Before stating the Assumption, let us provide some explanation. Recall that IC requires
Pi, to be increasing in ci: Pointwise optimization assigns probability one to the allocation
with the highest virtual surplus at each vector of types. Along a region where there is no
switch, one allocation, say z1; is selected throughout and Pi(ci) =
R
C i
@
z1
i (ci;c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i;
which is increasing by the convexity of i: Incentive compatibility can be violated though,
when the seller wishes to switch, say, from allocation z1 to z2: At such a point c we have that
J^z2(c)  J^z1(c) and IC requires that Pi does not decrease, namely
R
C i
@
z2
i (ci;c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i R
C i
@
z1
i (ci;c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i. Our condition guarantees precisely this.
Assumption 4 26 Let z1,z2 2 Z be any two allocations. For a given cost realization (ci; c i)
if27 z1 2 argmax
z2Z
J^z(c
 
i ; c i) and z2 2 argmax
z2Z
J^z(c
+
i ; c i) , then
@
z2
i (ci)
@ci
 @
z1
i (ci)
@ci
:
We now state another condition, which is more stringent, but often easier to verify than
Assumption 4:
Assumption 5 For all i and for all c i, when
@Jz2 (ci;c i)
@ci
 @Jz1 (ci;c i)@ci then
@
z2
i (ci)
@ci

@
z1
i (ci)
@ci
:
Lemma 6 Assumption 5 is su¢ cient for Assumption 4.
26This condition has similar avor to condition 5.1 in the environment of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001b).
We are grateful to Benny Moldovanu for bringing to our attention this connection.
27The notation c i means limit from the left to ci and c
+
i means limit from the right to ci:
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For the special class where payo¤s are linear in own type, there is an even simpler
condition that is su¢ cient for Assumption 4: This is the well known monotone hazard rate
condition.
Lemma 7 If the payo¤ functions are of the form zi (ci)  Azi+Bzi ci, and Fi(ci)fi(ci) is increasing
in ci for all i, then Assumption 4 is satised.
With the help of Assumption 4, it is straightforward to nd an optimal assignment rule
which is described in the following result.
Proposition 8 Suppose that (28) holds.28 If Assumption 4 is satised, then an optimal
allocation p is given by:29
pz

(c) =
(
1 if z 2 argmax
z
J^z(c)
0 otherwise
:
The qualitative features of the solution depend on whether the conditions in (28) are
satised for ci = ci, c

i = ci; or c

i 2 (ci; ci). If ci = ci, then J^z(c) < Sz(c) and the seller
sells less often than it is e¢ cient. When the conditions in (28) are satised for ci = ci,
J^z(c)  Sz(c) and overselling occurs, as stated in the next corollary:
Corollary 9 Suppose that ci (p; p
 i(p)) = ci for all i. Suppose also that when the seller
keeps all objects, every buyer gets a payo¤ independent of his type, for example zero. Then,
at a revenue maximizing assignment rule the seller keeps all the objects less often than
what is ex-post e¢ cient.
The situation in Example 5.1 exhibits this feature. As noted in the introduction, over-
sellingis in contrast with a standard intuition from monopoly theory, where the monopolist
restricts supply in order to generate higher revenue.
When ci 2 (ci; ci); then J^z(c) < Sz(c) for some type proles, and J^z(c)  Sz(c) for
others. Here, underselling and overselling can occur simultaneously, (the seller keeps the
objects in some cases where he should sell, and sells them in cases where he should keep
them), or even ex-post e¢ ciency can occur. Example 5.2 illustrates a scenario where the
critical type is interior and the revenue maximizing mechanism is ex-post e¢ cient.
Now we move on to see how much of what we learnt, by examining revenue maximizing
mechanisms in linear cases, applies when revenue is non-linear in p. As discussed, this
occurs when ci (p; p
 i(p)) depends on p: The intuitions discussed above remain: the relation
between modied virtual surpluses, and real surpluses will depend on the actual values of
ci (p; p
 i(p)); for i 2 I; at the optimal p. We proceed to examples.
28 In Appendix C we describe a couple of specic environments where (28) holds. The list is not, nor it is
meant to be exhaustive.
29Ties can be broken arbitrarily.
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5. Illustration of the Solution
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the solution in simple but economically insightful
examples.
5.1 The Role of Steep Outside Options
Consider 2 rms ghting for a single slot to advertise their products. There are three feasible
allocations. The seller keeps the slot, z0; rm 1 gets the slot, z1 or rm 2 gets the slot, z2.
The value of airing a spot depends on the actual cost parameter ci of rm i, which is
private information and is uniformly and independently distributed in [0; 1] for both rms.
The value of not airing a spot depends on the allocation implemented: a rm su¤ers an
externality, (which depends on its cost parameter ci), if its competitor gets the spot, while it
gets a payo¤ of 0 in case nobody gets it. Let zji (ci) denote the payo¤ of rm i if allocation
zj is implemented and its type is ci: The payo¤s that accrue to each rm from each of these
alternatives are
z01 (c1) = 0 
z0
2 (c2) = 0
z11 (c1) = 1  c1 z12 (c2) =  2c2
z21 (c1) =  2c1 z22 (c2) = 1  c2
:
An assignment rule here is p(c) = (pz0(c); pz1(c); pz2(c)); where c = (c1; c2).
The virtual surpluses of allocations z0; z1 and z2 are given by
Jz0(c) = 0
Jz1(c) = 1  2c1   4c2
Jz2(c) = 1  2c2   4c1:
Using (6) we can write the sellers problem as:
max
p
Z
[0;1]
Z
[0;1]
[pz0(c)Jz0(c) + p
z1(c)Jz1(c) + p
z2(c)Jz2(c)]dc1dc2   V1(1)  V2(1) (30)
subject to:
P1(c1)   
R
[pz1(c) + 2pz2(c)]dc2 be increasing
P2(c2)   
R
[2pz1(c) + pz2(c)]dc1 be increasing
0  pzi(c)  1; i = 0; 1; 2 and
2P
i=0
pzi(c) = 1
The solution of this problem crucially depends on the allocations that prevail if a buyer
refuses to participate in the mechanism, since these determine Vi(1; p; p i(p)); i = 1; 2: We
demonstrate this point by solving for the optimal mechanism under two di¤erent scenaria
regarding the outside options that buyers face.
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Scenario 1: Flat Outside Options
In this case if a buyer does not participate the seller must keep the slot. Then
p 1 = p 2 = (pz0(c); pz1(c); pz2(c)) = (1; 0; 0) :
Given this non-participation assignment rule, the payo¤ to buyer i from not participating
is z0i (ci) = 0; which is independent of i
0s type. Then participation constraint binds at
the worst type c1 = c2 = 1; because at an incentive compatible assignment rule Vi is
decreasing in ci:30 This implies immediately that
V1(1) = V2(1) = 0;
and the objective function in (30), after substituting for the J 0zs, it becomes
max
p
Z
[0;1]
Z
[0;1]
[pz1(c) (1  2c1   4c2) + pz2(c) (1  2c2   4c1)]dc1dc2: (31)
Pointwise maximization gives us
p(c) =
8><>:
(0; 1; 0) if c2  c1 and 1  2c1 + 4c2
(0; 0; 1) if c1  c2 and 1  2c2 + 4c1
(1; 0; 0) if 2c1 + 4c2 > 1 and 2c2 + 4c1 > 1
;
which is feasible, and hence optimal. Feasibility follows from Lemma 7, since we have linear
payo¤s and the uniform distribution satises MHR:We graph the revenue assignment rule
30Recall Figure 3.
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in Figure 6.
Seller
0
c2
c2=(1-2c1)/4
c2=0.5-2c1
Firm 1
Firm 2
Optimal assignment rule when seller keeps the slot in
case i does not participate
c1
Figure 6
Scenario 2: Steep Outside Options
In this case, if a rm fails to participate the seller gives the slot to its competitor, the
other rm, that is
p 1 = (pz0(c); pz1(c); pz2(c)) = (0; 0; 1) and p 2 = (pz0(c); pz1(c); pz2(c)) = (0; 1; 0):
It is not hard to see that this is the optimal way for the seller to threaten buyers, since
giving the slot to the competitor has the lowest payo¤ for buyer i: We now argue that in
this case the critical type will be ci =ci = 0; for all i and p: This is because allocation zj
gives the lowest payo¤ to i when his cost is the smallest possible, that is

zj
i (0)  zi (0) for all z 2 fz0; z1; z2g (32)
and it gives the steepest payo¤ to buyer i; for i; j = 1; 2 since we have that
d
zj
i (ci)
dci
 d
z
i
dci
for all z 2 fz0; z1; z2g: (33)
From (32) and (33) it follows that the participation constraint will always bind at ci =ci = 0:
Such a situation is depicted in Figure 4.
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Then for i; j = 1; 2 we have
Vi(1) = 
zj
i (c

i ) +
1Z
ci
Pi(ci)dci (34)
= 
zj
i (0) +
1Z
0
Pi(ci)dci
= 0 +
1Z
0
1Z
0
[ pzi(c)  2pzj (c)]dc:
Substituting these expressions in the objective function, we get modied virtual surpluses,
J^z0(c) = 0
J^z1(c) = 4  2c1   4c2
J^z2(c) = 4  2c2   4c1
and the sellers problem can be rewritten us
max
p
R
[0;1]
R
[0;1]
[pz1(c) (4  2c1   4c2) + pz2(c) (4  2c2   4c1)]dc1dc2
s:t: P1(c1)   
R
[pz1(c) + 2pz2(c)]dc2 is increasing
P2(c2)   
R
[2pz1(c) + pz2(c)]dc1 is increasing
0  pzi(c)  1; i = 0; 1; 2 and
2P
i=0
pzi(c) = 1:
: (35)
By comparing (31) and (35), we see that how the terms V1(1) and V2(1) can a¤ect the
objective function.
The assignment rule corresponding to pointwise maximization is given by
p(c) =
8><>:
(0; 1; 0) if c2  c1 and 4  2c1 + 4c2
(0; 0; 1) if c1  c2 and 4  2c2 + 4c1
(1; 0; 0) if 2c1 + 4c2 > 4 and 2c2 + 4c1 > 4
;
which by Lemma 7 is feasible, and hence optimal. This assignment rule is shown in Figure
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7.
Seller
0 c1
c2
c2=(4-2c1)/4
c2=2(1-c1)
Firm 1
Firm 2
Figure 7
Optimal assignment rule when seller gives the slot to j
in case i does not participate
As discussed earlier, when participation constraints bind at the smallest cost over-
sellingoccurs, compared to what is e¢ cient. In this example, the ex-post e¢ cient allo-
cationis given by
pe(c) =
8><>:
(0; 1; 0) if c2  c1 and c1 + 2c2  1
(0; 0; 1) if c1  c2 and 2c1 + c2  1
(1; 0; 0) otherwise
:
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We illustrate it in Figure 8.
Seller
0
c2
c2=(1-c1)/2
c2=1-2c1
Firm 1
Firm 2
Efficient Assignment
c1
Figure 8
Comparing p(c) and pe(c); depicted in Figures 7 and 8 respectively, we see that at the
revenue maximizing assignment rule rms 1 and 2 obtain the slot for cost realizations where
e¢ ciency dictates that the seller should keep it.
This example illustrates that the optimal assignment rule critically depends on the
outside options that each buyer faces. When the seller can only keep the object if a buyer
fails to participate, the optimal assignment rule assigns the slot less often than it is e¢ cient.
In contrast, in the case where if a buyer fails to participate, the seller gives the slot to the
other rm, the revenue maximizing assignment rule allocates the spot more often then it
is e¢ cient. The reason why the solution in these two scenaria di¤ers, is that in the second
one when rm i fails to participate its payo¤ depends on its cost, (zji (ci) =  2ci):
Before closing, we would like to stress that the mere presence of externalities, (regardless
of whether they are positive or negative), will not lead to an optimal mechanism where
overselling occurs compared to the ex-post e¢ cient level. This is illustrated in the following
small modication of the current example:
z01 (c1) = 0 
z0
2 (c2) = 0
z11 (c1) = 1  c1 z12 (c2) =  0:5
z21 (c1) =  0:5 z22 (c2) = 1  c2
:
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The virtual surpluses of the various allocations in this case are given by
Jz0(c) = 0
Jz1(c) = 1  2c1   0:5
Jz2(c) = 1  2c2   0:5:
Observe that as in the original example there are negative externalities. If a rms competi-
tor gets the slot it gets a negative payo¤ of  0:5: The important di¤erence is that now this
payo¤ does not depend on the rms cost. Consequently, when the seller is threatening to
assign the slot to a rms competitor, that rm faces a payo¤ that is independent from its
type. A consequence of that is that irrespective of whether the seller keeps the slot if a rm
does not participate, or she gives it to a competitor, the virtual surpluses are una¤ected,
since a rms outside payo¤ is a straight line, (0 in the case where the seller keeps the good
and  0:5 in the case that its gives the slot to the other rm), which implies that in both
cases the critical type is ci = ci = 1: Also notice that the virtual surpluses of z0; z1 and z2
are smaller, (possibly weakly smaller), than the actual surpluses of these allocations, which
are given by
Sz0(c) = 0
Sz1(c) = 1  c1   0:5
Sz2(c) = 1  c2   0:5;
hence oversellingcannot occur.
Summarizing, outside options a¤ect the optimal assignment rule only if the payo¤s
from non-participation are type-dependent. In the next example we show how in the case
of type-dependent outside options the seller can increase both revenue and e¢ ciency by
appropriately choosing the right outside options.
5.2 An Example with Coexistence of Steep & Flat Outside Options31
A seller has an invention which is of potential interest to rm A. The rm has a cost
parameter c distributed uniformly in [0; 1]. In case rm A gets the exclusive rights, its
valuation is given by zA(c) = 5 5c. In case that there is no sale, the seller can either keep
the invention or open source it. A very e¢ cient rm is not afraid of competition and prefers
open sourcing to no sale at all, whereas a more ine¢ cient rm prefers the opposite.32 In
particular, in the case of no sale rm A gets z1(c) = 0, and in the case of open sourcing
31This is essentially the example described in the introduction.
32This is di¤erent from the previous example, where the allocation that hurts buyers the most is always
the same. Irrespective of the cost parameter, a rm prefers that the seller keeps the slot, to its competitor
obtaining it.
32
it gets z2(c) = 1   10c. So if rm A is very e¢ cient with c  110 , the option of no one
obtaining the invention is worse than open sourcing. The opposite is true when c  110 . An
assignment rule here is p(c) = (pzA(c); pz1(c); pz2(c)). In case rm A does not participate in
the sale, the seller is indi¤erent between keeping the invention and making it open source.
In fact, since there is nothing else the seller can do in that case, any randomization between
these options is optimal from her perspective and hence credible.
The seller solves:
max
p
1R
0
[pzA(c) (5  10c) + pz2(c) (1  20c)]dc  V (1; p; p i(p))
s:t:  [5pzA(c) + 10pz2(c)] is increasing
0  pz(c)  1 for all z 2 fzA; z1; z2g and z2fzA;z1;z2gpz(c) = 1
(36)
This example belongs to the class of problems which satisfy (28) for an interior ci : As already
discussed, in this case an optimal non-participation rule, which we call p A; depends on the
assignment rule p that the seller wants to implement. We therefore start by specifying the
optimal p A as a function of p and then solve for an optimal p:
1. Finding an optimal p A(p)
With a slight abuse of notation, let p A denote the probability that allocation z2 is
chosen if A fails to participate, and let (1  p A) denote the probability that allocation z1
will be chosen. Associated with this non-participation assignment rule is the payo¤ that
will accrue to A if it fails to participate
UA(c; p
 A) = (1  p A)  0 + p A(1  10c)
= p A   10p Ac: (37)
We know that the optimal non-participation assignment rule must minimize
V (1) = UA(c
(p;  A); p A) +
1Z
c(p; A)
dV (c)
dc
dc;
which by using (37) can be rewritten as
V (1) =  A   10 Ac(p;  A) +
1Z
c(p; A)
dV (c)
dc
dc: (38)
Now at a solution33 p A(p) the total derivative of V (1) with respect to  A is equal to the
partial, and it is given by
dV (1)
d A

 A=p A(p)
= 1  10c(p; p A(p)):
33This property is an envelope condition. We state it formally in Lemma A in Appendix C.
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Moreover, at an interior minimum it must be the case that
dV (1)
d A

 A=p A(p)
= 1  10c(p; p A(p)) = 0;
which implies that
c(p; p A(p)) =
1
10
for all p and p A: (39)
We have therefore veried that this example satises (28) for ci =
1
10 ; and hence the critical
type is independent of p and p A:
We proceed to nd an optimal p A as a function of an assignment rule p: The slope of
the payo¤ from non-participation is
@UA(c; p
 A)
@c
=  10p A:
At an optimal p A this has to be equal to the slope of the participation payo¤ V at
c(p; p A(p)) which in our case it is 110 . In other words
dV (c)
dc

c= 1
10
=  10p A; (40)
now given an assignment rule p(c) = (pzA(c); pz1(c); pz2(c)), V (c) is given by
V (c) = pzA(c)(5  5c) + pz1(c)  0 + pz2(c)(1  10c);
and its slope is given by
dV (c)
dc
=  5pzA(c)  10pz2(c): (41)
With the help of (41), (40) can be rewritten as
 10p A =  5pzA( 1
10
)  10pz2( 1
10
);
which reduces to
p A(p) =
1
2
pzA(
1
10
) + pz2(
1
10
): (42)
Equation (42) gives us an optimal p A as a function of the assignment rule p.34
34This example illustrates the interdependence of optimal non-participation assignment rules with the
assignment rules, that is how p A can depend on p. This feature is novel and does not appear in the earlier
work, (see for instance JMS (1996)), where optimal threats are independent from the way the seller wants
to allocate the goods. Here equation (42) tells us that for di¤erent assignment rules, the optimal, from the
sellers point of view, non-participation assignment rule, is di¤erent. For example, for
(~pzA(c); ~pz1(c); ~pz2(c)) =
(
(1; 0; 0) if c 2 [0; 1
2
]
(0; 1; 0) if c 2 [ 1
2
; 1]
34
2. Finding an optimal p
With the help of (39) V (1); given by (38), can be rewritten as
V (1) =  
1Z
1
10
[5pzA(c) + 10pz2(c)]dc: (43)
Now by substituting (43) into (36), the sellers problem can be rewritten as
max
p
1
10R
0
[pzA(c) (5  10c) + pz2(c) (1  20c)]dc+
1R
1
10
pzA(c) (10  10c) + pz2(c) (11  20c)]dc
s:t:  [5pzA(c) + 10pz2(c)] is increasing
0  pz(c)  1 for all z 2 fzA; z1; z2g and z2fzA;z1;z2gpz(c) = 1:
Pointwise maximization gives us that pzA(c) = 1 for all c; and the optimal assignment rule
is
p(c) = (pzA(c) = 1; pz1(c) = 0; pz2(c) = 0) (44)
which is feasible, since irrespective of report, rm A obtains the object with probability 1
and pays the same price, which is equal to 4.5. By substituting (44) into (42), we get that
the optimal non-participation assignment rule is given by
p A(p) =
1
2
or more precisely
p A(p) = (pzA(c); pz1(c); pz2(c)) = (0;
1
2
;
1
2
):
In this example the revenue maximizing assignment rule is ex-post e¢ cient. To see this,
notice that zA(c)  z1(c) and zA(c)  z2(c) for all c 2 [0; 1], so its always e¢ cient to sell
the invention to the rm. This e¢ ciency property is rather surprising given the presence
of private information that is statistically independent. The sellers expected revenue is
4:5: As payo¤ is the 5   5c   4:5 which is exactly equal to its outside option which is
the optimal non-participation assignment rule is p A(~p) = 1
2
. If the assignment rule is instead
(p^zA(c); p^z1(c); p^z2(c)) =
(
( 1
2
; 0; 1
2
) if c 2 [0; 1
2
]
(0; 1; 0) if c 2 [ 1
2
; 1]
the optimal non-participation assignment rule is p A(p^) = 3
4
.
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0:5  0 + 0:5  (1  10c) = 0:5  5c: These payo¤s are graphed in Figure 9.
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Buyer’s Payoffs
It is interesting to compare this solution to the one when open sourcing (allocation z2)
is not an available option. In this case the optimal assignment rule is
p(c) = (pzA(c); pz1(c)) =
(
(1; 0) if c 2 [0; 12 ]
(0; 1) if c 2 [12 ; 1]
;
and trivially the non-participation assignment rule is p A(p) = (0; 1): Then the sellers
expected revenue is 1:25: This assignment rule is ine¢ cient, since half of the time Firm A
does not obtain the invention, whereas it is always e¢ cient that it does. Comparing to the
previous case, we see that the option of open sourcing increases both the sellers revenue,
(it more than triples), and e¢ ciency. This is despite the fact that open sourcing is never
implemented.
This example highlights an important new insight. When the payo¤from non-participation
depends on a buyers type, even allocations that are never implemented can crucially a¤ect
the revenue maximizing assignment of the objects. The introduction of the option of open
sourcing increased the revenue of the seller, and made the revenue maximizing assignment
rule ex-post e¢ cient, even though it is never implemented. This example also shows that
optimal non-participation assignment rules can be random.
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6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study revenue maximizing auctions when buyersoutside payo¤s depend
on their type. Our analysis shows that key intuitions from earlier work on optimal auctions
fail to generalize. Very often e¢ ciency and revenue maximization are conicting objectives.
However, here we show that a revenue maximizing mechanism sometimes will allocate the
objects in an ex-post e¢ cient way, and sometimes it will sell too often. The broad message
is that type-dependent non-participation payo¤s change the nature of the distortions that
arise from the presence of asymmetric information. The designer by creating the appropri-
ateoutside options can increase both revenue, and the overall e¢ ciency of the mechanism.
This paper also encompasses a large number of important allocation problems as a special
case. Potential applications range from the allocation of airport take-o¤ and landing slots,
to the allocation of positions in teams.
7. Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 135
By the convexity of zi (; c i) we have that Vi is a maximum of convex functions, so it
is convex, and therefore di¤erentiable a.e. It is also easy to check that the following are
equivalent:
(a) (p; x) is incentive compatible
(b) Pi(ci) 2 @Vi(ci)
(c) Ui(ci; ci; (p; x)) = Vi(ci)
We now use these equivalent statements to prove necessity and su¢ ciency in our Lemma.
(=)) Here we use the fact that incentive compatibility implies (b). A result in Krishna
and Maenner (2001) then implies (5). By the convexity of Vi, we know that @Vi is monotone,
so:
(Pi(ci)  Pi(c0i))(ci   c0i)  0:
This immediately implies (4).
((=) To prove that (4) implies incentive compatibility its enough to show that Pi(ci) 2
@Vi(ci). By (4) and (5),
Vi(c
0
i)  Vi(ci) =
c0iZ
ci
Pi(s)ds
 Pi(ci)(c0i   ci)
which shows Pi(ci) 2 @Vi(ci).
35This proof is relatively standard, see for instance, Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999) and is included
for completeness.
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Expected Payment at an Incentive Compatible Mechanism36
Recall that
Vi(ci) =
Z
C i
"X
z2Z
pz(c)zi (c)  xi(c)
#
f i(c i)dc i: (45)
By integrating (45) with respect to ci; and by rearranging we get thatZ
C
xi(c)f(c)dc =
Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(c)zi (c)f(c)dc 
Z
Ci
Vi(ci)fi(ci)dci: (46)
Integrating the second condition in (5) over C i and by changing the order of integration
we get:
Z
Ci
Vi(ci)dci =
Z
Ci
[Vi(ci) 
ciZ
ci
Pi(si)dsi]fi(ci)dci
= Vi(ci) 
Z
Ci
Pi(si)
siZ
ci
fi(ci)dcidsi
= Vi(ci) 
Z
Ci
Pi(ci)Fi(ci)dci
= Vi(ci) 
Z
Ci
Z
C i
X
z2Z
pz(ci; c i)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc iFi(ci)dci
= Vi(ci) 
Z
C
X
z2Z
pz(ci; c i)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
f(c)dc:
Combining (46) with last expression, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 6
If there exists a point (ci; c i) such that z1 2 argmax
z2Z
J^z(c
 
i ; c i) and z2 2 argmax
z2Z
J^z(c
+
i ; c i),
then it must be the case that @Jz2 (ci;c i)@ci 
@Jz1 (ci;c i)
@ci
. If Assumption 5 is satised, then we
have that d
z2
i (ci)
dci
 d
z1
i (ci)
dci
, which implies that Assumption 4 is also satised.
Proof of Lemma 7
We just need to prove that Assumption 5 is satised. For that, suppose that @Jz1 (ci;c i)@ci 
@Jz2 (ci;c i)
@ci
. By the linearity assumption, we have thatBz1i

1 +

Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
0
 Bz2i

1 +

Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
0
.
Then, since

Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
0
 0 by assumption, we get Bz1i  Bz2i , which is equivalent to
d
z1
i (ci)
dci
 d
z2
i (ci)
dci
under the linearity assumption.
36This proof is very standard and is included for completeness.
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Proof of Theorem 8
The solution proposed corresponds to pointwise maximization, so the only possibility
that is not optimal is that is not feasible. To check that feasibility is satised remember
that
Pi(ci) =
Z
C i
X
z2Z
pz(ci; c i)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i
and consider a xed c i. In a region of cost realizations where z 2 argmax
z2Z
J^z(c); the
allocation rule p(c) does not change since along this region pz(c) = 1. Then, Pi(ci) is
increasing by the convexity of zi (; c i). For a ci where z1 2 argmax
z2Z
J^z(c
 
i ; c i) and
z2 2 argmax
z2Z
J^z(c
+
i ; c i), p
z1(ci
 ; c i) = 1 and pz2(ci
+; c i) = 1, Pi(ci) is increasing by
Assumption 4.
Proof of Corollary 9
Lets denote by z0 the allocation where the seller keeps all the objects and consider a
xed realization of types c. Since z0i (c) is constant for all i, its derivative vanishes, and we
have that Jz0(c) =
NP
i=1
z0i (c) = Sz0(c). On the other hand, for every allocation z, its virtual
surplus is given by
Jz(c) =
NX
i=1

zi (c) +
@zi (c)
@ci
Fi(ci)  1
fi(ci)

> Sz(c) 
NX
i=1
zi (c):
Then it is easy to see that the set where the seller keeps the objects,
n
cjz0 2 argmax
z
Sz(c)
o
,
is a subset of the set where it would be e¢ cient that she keeps them,
n
cjz0 2 argmax
z
Jz(c)
o
.
8. Appendix B: An Example where Revenue Depends Non-Linearly in p:
Suppose there is one buyer and three possible allocations z1; z2; z3 and that c is uniformly
distributed on [0; 1]. The payo¤s of the allocations are z1(c) = 10   10c, z2(c) = 0
and z3(c) =  5c; where c 2 [c; c]: Then it is easy to that irrespective of p an optimal
non-participation assignment rule is (p 1)z3 = 1, so the non-participation assignment rule
assigns probability one to allocation z3. An assignment rule p(c) = (pz1(c); pz2(c); pz3(c))
induces a surplus
V (c) = V (c; p; p 1) 
cZ
c
P (s)ds
which, in the points where it is di¤erentiable satises dV (c)dc = P (c) =  10pz1(c)   5pz3(c).
The type where the participation constraint binds depends on how P (c); which is the slope
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of the payo¤ from participating in the mechanism, compares to the slope of the payo¤ from
non-participating, which is given by  5. The critical type c depends non-linearly on p,
and it is given by
c(p; p 1) =
8><>:
c if   5   10pz1(0)  5pz3(0)
c if   5   10pz1(1)  5pz3(1)
c otherwise
;
where c satises that  10pz1(c )  5pz3(c )   5   10pz1(c+)  5pz3(c+). Since
V (c; p; p 1) =  5c(p; p 1) +
cZ
c(p;p 1)
[ 10pz1(c)  5pz3(c)]dc;
we have that the objective function is non-linear in the assignment rule p.
9. Appendix C: Two Specific Environments where Critical Types are
Independent of p:
I. Steep Outside Options: Participation Constraints bind at the best type ci = ci:
We now provide the precise conditions for the case of very responsiveoutside options,
and argue that under those conditions (28) are satised at ci = ci:
Recall that we use zi (ci) =
R
C i
zi (ci; c i)f i(c i)dc i to denote the expected payo¤ to
agent i if allocation z is implemented.
Assumption 10 Suppose that outside options are steep, in the sense that for all i 2 I,
there exists an allocation zSi 2 Z i such that
d
zSi
i (ci)
dci
 d
z
i (ci)
dci
for all z 2 Z (47)
and

zSi
i (ci)  zi (ci) for all z 2 Z: (48)
Proposition 11 Under Assumption 10 it follows that for all p (a) (p^ i)z 
(
1 if z = zSi
0 if not
,
for all i is an optimal non-participation assignment rule; (b) cSi = ci; for all i, and (c)
U i(c
S
i )  z
S
i
i (ci):
Proof. (a)The optimality of p^ i follows immediately from (47) and (48).
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(b) Now we show that cSi = ci; by establishing that if the participation constraint is
satised at ci = ci; then it is satised for all ci 2 Ci. This follows from three observations.
(i) Pi(ci) 2 @Vi(ci),
(ii)
Pi(ci) =
Z
C i
X
z2Z
pz(c)
@zi (ci; c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i

Z
C i
X
z2Z
pz(c)
@
zSi
i (ci; c i)
@ci
f i(c i)dc i
=
d
zSi
i (ci)
dci
(iii) Vi(ci)  z
S
i
i (ci):
Observations (i) and (ii) imply that the derivative of Vi is always greater than the
derivative of 
zSi
i : These two, together with (iii) imply that V (ci)  
zSi
i (ci) for all ci 2 Ci.
(c) Finally, it follows immediately that U i(c

i )  z
S
i
i (ci):
II. Coexistence of Steep and Flat Outside Options: Participation Constraints bind at
interior types ci 2 (ci; ci):
Suppose that there are two extreme allocations for each buyer, one that gives the attest
payo¤ zSi ; and one that gives the steepest, z
F
i . If the attest option were to be used then
ci = ci and if the steepest option were to be used, then c

i = ci: When neither of these two
options is clearly worse, it turns out that an optimal p i(p) randomizes between the two
options and the participation constraint always binds at the type who is indi¤erent between
zSi and z
F
i : We now describe the precise conditions and establish the claim.
Assumption 12 Suppose that Z i = fzSi ; zFi g and that z
S
i
i (ci); 
zFi
i (ci) satisfy
d
zSi
i (ci)
dci

dzi (ci)
dci
 d
zFi
i (ci)
dci
for all z 2 Z and ci 2 Ci and z
S
i
i (ci)  
zFi
i (ci): Suppose also that either
(i) values are private or (ii) the seller can only use non-participation assignment rules that
do not depend on the types of other players (that is p i 2 P i =) p i(c i)  p i).
Proposition 13 Under Assumption 12 it follows that (a) for all p the critical type is ci = c^i
where c^i satises

zSi
i (c^i) = 
zFi
i (c^i) (49)
(b) an optimal p i given p is determined by the condition (p i(p))zSi d
zSi
i (c^i)
dci
+(1 (p i(p))zFi )d
zFi
i (c^i)
dci
2
@Vi(c^i), and (c) for all p and p i(p) we have U i(ci (p; p
 i(p)); p i(p)) = z
F
i
i (c^i) = 
zSi
i (c^i):
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Proof: To prove this Proposition, we rst prove the following Lemma:
Lemma A.
dVi(ci)
d( i)z

 i=p i(p)
=
@Vi(ci)
@( i)z

 i=p i(p)
= zi (c

i (p; p
 i(p))); for all z 2 Z i: (50)
Proof. We suppose for simplicity that the derivative @c

i (p;
 i)
@ i is well dened, (otherwise
we can do all the analysis with subgradients).
Then, di¤erentiating Vi(ci) = U i(c

i (p; 
 i(p));  i)  
ci (p;
 i(p))R
ci
Pi(s)ds with respect to
( i)z we obtain that
dVi(ci)
d( i)z
=
@U i(c

i (p; 
 i);  i)
@( i)z
+

@U i(c

i (p; 
 i);  i)
@ci
  Pi(ci (p;  i))

@ci (p; 
 i)
@( i)z
: (51)
Given an assignment rule p and a non-participation assignment rule  i, we know that at
an optimal mechanism ci (p; 
 i) satises ci (p; 
 i) 2 argmin
ci
"
 
ciR
ci
Pi(s)ds  U i(ci;  i)
#
.
Depending on whether ci (p; 
 i) 2 (ci; ci); or ci (p;  i) = ci or ci (p;  i) = ci; there are
three cases to consider.
Case 1: ci (p; 
 i) 2 (ci; ci)
Since ci (p; 
 i) 2 argmin
ci
"
 
ciR
ci
Pi(s)ds  U i(ci;  i)
#
, an interior solution (which is pre-
cisely the case under investigation), must satisfy
dVi(ci)
dci

ci=ci (p; i)
=
@U i(ci(p; 
 i);  i)
@ci

ci=ci (p; i)
: (52)
Then recall that Vi(ci) = Vi(ci) 
ciR
ci
Pi(s)ds , which implies that
dVi(ci)
dci

ci=ci (p; i)
= Pi(c

i (p; 
 i)): (53)
Then, substituting (52) and (53) into (51), we obtain that
dVi(ci)
d( i)z

 i=p i(p)
=
@U i(c

i (p; p
 i(p)); p i(p))
@( i)z
= zi (c

i (p; p
 i(p))); for all z 2 Z i;
which is what we wanted to show.
Case 2: ci (p; 
 i) = ci
If p and  isuch that ci (p; 
 i) = ci and we change zth component of the non-participation
assignment rule p i then two things can happen. One possibility is that
@ci (p; 
 i)
@( i)z
= 0;
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in that case (51), reduces to (50): Another possibility is that we move to a ci in the interior,
in which case we are back to Case 1.37
Case 3: ci (p; 
 i) = ci
This case is identical to the previous one.
Now, we prove the Proposition.
(a) Because there are only zSi and z
F
i in Z
 i; we can write
Vi(ci) = 
 iz
S
i
i (c

i (p; 
 i)) + (1   i)zFii (ci (p;  i)) +
ciZ
ci (p; i)
Pi(s)ds:
Because of the envelope condition proved before, that is (50), we can write
dVi(ci)
d i

 i=p i(p)
=
@Vi(ci)
@ i

 i=p i(p)
= 
zSi
i (c

i (p; 
 i))  zFii (ci (p;  i)): (54)
When  i is in a neighborhood of 0 then the outside option is at and ci = ci:When 
 i is
in a neighborhood of 1 then the outside option is very steep and ci = ci: This means that
@ci (p;
 i)
@ i

 i=0
=
@ci (p;
 i)
@ i

 i=1
= 0, and also we get that
dVi(ci)
d i

 i=0
= 
zSi
i (c

i (p; 0))  z
F
i
i (c

i (p; 0))
= 
zSi
i (ci)  
zFi
i (ci) < 0
dVi(ci)
d i

 i=1
= 
zSi
i (c

i (p; 1))  z
F
i
i (c

i (p; 1))
= 
zSi
i (ci)  
zFi
i (ci) > 0:
These two inequalities imply that the optimally chosen  i, that is p i(p), is interior, so
it satises the FONC dVi(ci)
d i

 i=p i(p)
= 0, because of (54) it implies 
zSi
i (c

i (p; 
 i)) =

zFi
i (c

i (p; 
 i)), from which we get that irrespective of p we have that
ci = c^i;
where c^i satises (49). Moreover, because of the assumptions, the functions 
zSi
i and 
zFi
i
cross at most once, so ci is uniquely determined.
37Note that since both Vi and U i are decreasing and convex in ci, so changing (p
 i)z slightly cannot result
in ci moving from ci to ci:
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(b) By (8) it follows immediately that an optimal p i given pmust satisfy that p i(p)d
zSi
i (c^i)
dci
+
(1  p i(p))d
zFi
i (c^i)
dci
2 @Vi(c^i).
(c) Is immediate.
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